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Abstract
Income uncertainty in the rural economy is widely considered an important impediment to 
growth in poor countries. This paper uses a rich dataset on productivity, land use, and output 
for 17 different crops across 500,000 plots of land in 87 countries to study the impact of uncer-
tainty in the agricultural sector. The analysis relies on historical variability in crop productivity 
driven by local climatic conditions to estimate the impact of uncertainty on farmers’ land 
allocation. Applying a standard portfolio framework, we estimate that the incentive to diversify 
led to large losses in agricultural revenue. We adopt a spatial regression discontinuity approach 
that compares how national institutions affected agricultural outcomes near the borders of for-
mer British and French colonies in Africa. We find that farmers in former British colonies, 
which tended to adopt pro-private sector policies, adopted more advanced input technologies 
and achieved higher crop-specific returns. In contrast, farmers in former French colonies, which 
tended to devote more public resources to the agricultural sector, tolerated higher levels of 
uncertainty and adopted more specialized crop portfolios. These offsetting effects suggest that 
both a well-functioning market system along with public investments that reduce risk may be 
necessary to foster rural economic development.
∗Contact: Raphael Godefroy: raphael.godefroy@umontreal.ca. Joshua Lewis: joshua.lewis@umontreal.ca.
1 Introduction
Households in many rural areas are subject to substantial economic uncertainty. Recurrent
droughts and fluctuations in output prices lead to volatile agricultural earnings (e.g., Carter,
1997; Shanahan et al., 2009), and rural producers often lack access to credit or insurance markets
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986).1 Despite a growing literature, there is little consensus on
the impact of uncertainty on the rural economy, and estimated effects have varied widely across
different locations.
This paper combines a detailed micro-dataset on agricultural productivity, land use, and
output to study the economic impact of agricultural income uncertainty at a global scale. Our
analysis builds on the simple idea that risk-averse farmers facing ex ante uncertainty over future
revenue may sacrifice additional earnings in order to reduce exposure to income volatility. If
climate shocks and output price shocks affect all crops similarly, there would be no scope for
crop portfolio adjustments to lower income uncertainty. However, to the extent that output
price shocks and climatic conditions are crop specific, farmers may divert land to crops that
generate lower expected returns but help smooth against annual income fluctuations.
Our empirical analysis is based on detailed geospatial data assembled by the Global Agro-
Ecological Zones (GAEZ) project of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The GAEZ
project provides agronomic modelling with high-resolution data to provide information on po-
tential yields, harvested land, and actual yields by crop for 1.7 million plots of land that span
the earth’s surface.2 Potential crop yields are constructed by combining agronomic models
of specific crop requirements with high-resolution data on geographic and climatic conditions.
Crucially, the GAEZ data provides information potential crop yields by year, allowing us to
construct measures of mean and variability in yields by crop for each grid cell, whether or not
the crop is actually grown.
1For example, Kazianga and Udry (1996) find that the standard deviation of rainfall-induced income variation
is more than half of average rural household income in Burkina Faso.
2Land plots are available at the 5-arc-minute level, which corresponds to roughly 10 km by 10 km at the
equator.
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To estimate the impact of uncertainty on rural producers decision-making, we combine the
GAEZ crop data with a standard mean-variable portfolio framework (Markowitz, 1952). Farm-
ers are assumed to trade-off higher expected crop returns against increased variance on their
plot. We combine this simple framework with plot-level data on the observed land allocation,
expected returns by crop, and the historical covariance in crop yields to calculate the mean-
variance efficient (MVE) frontier for each plot of land: the maximum attainable return given
a specific level of output risk. The empirical analysis compares farm earnings under full spe-
cialization, the MVE allocation, and the actual allocation to calculate the fraction of revenue
losses attributable to diversification incentives across each plot of agricultural land. Farmers
may divert land from the highest yield crop for a variety of motives unrelated to output risk.
Our identification, which relies on the specific structure of the covariance matrix in crop returns,
allows us to the effect of uncertainty from other sources of land misallocation.
We have three main findings. First, ‘crop misallocation’ – the fact that farmers did not
specialize in revenue maximizing crops – is associated with large losses in agricultural revenue.
We estimate that revenue on the typical plot could have been doubled under full specialization.
These losses exceeded those attributable to within-crop distortions, and they were particularly
large in lower income countries. Crop misallocation cannot be explained by the selection of
workers into the agricultural sector (Lagakos and Waugh, 2013), distortions affecting the scale
of production units in agriculture (e.g., Adamopoulos and Restuccia, 2014), or farmers’ choices
of input technologies (e.g., Donovan, 2016), since each of these factors will have similar effects
on agricultural productivity irrespective of the particular crop that is grown.
Second, we find that the incentive to diversify land against annual income uncertainty
was the primary source of crop misallocation. Comparing the MVE efficient allocation to
the observed land allocation and the allocation under full specialization, we calculate that
80 percent of the losses from crop misallocation are attributable to diversification incentives.
Farmers in richer and poorer countries faced similar level of income uncertainty. Nevertheless,
their response was markedly different. Farmers in below-median income countries planted more
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different crops and devoted 20 percent less agricultural land to the dominant crop. Comparing
the sources of crop misallocation across countries, we estimate that the losses attributable to
income uncertainty were 50 percent larger in countries with below-median income. Together,
these findings suggest that rural income uncertainty is a major source of revenue losses in
poorer countries, and that limited access to insurance and incomplete credit markets may be
an important reason why agricultural productivity is so low in poor countries.
Third, using a regression discontinuity design, we find no significant difference in overall
agricultural output across African farmers operating at the borders of former British and French
colonies. These small overall effects mask two offsetting forces. On the one hand, farmers in
former British colonies used more advanced input technologies and achieved higher crop-specific
returns. On the other hand, these farmers were more likely to diversify their crop portfolio
given a particular level of economic uncertainty. We argue that these findings are consistent
with the institutional arrangements of the two sets of countries. In particular, former British
colonies were more likely to adopt pro-private sector policies, and better functioning credit
markets, which may have faciliated investment in the agricultural sector. In contrast, former
French colonies had larger public sectors that devoted more resources to the agricultural sector,
potentially shielding rural producers from the consequences of income volatility. Together, the
findings suggest that both a well-functioning market systems along with some form of non-
market interventions that reduce individual exposure to uncertainty may be necessary to foster
rural economic development.
The paper contributes to the large literature on the role of uncertainty in agriculture. Re-
searchers have identified a number of channels through which individual households cope with
income uncertainty in the face of credit constraints, including precautionary savings (Deaton,
1990, 1991; Fafchamps et al., 1998), remittances from urban family members (Rapoport and
Docquier, 2006; Gonzalez-Velosa, 2012, Yang and Choi, 2007), delayed technological adoption
(Antle and Crissman, 1990, Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011, Donovan, 2014), and crop diver-
sification (Kurosaki, and Fafchamps, 2002; Di Falco, and Chavas, 2009, Nicola, 2015). Despite
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this research, there is ongoing debate of the effectiveness of these strategies (Udry, 2016). The
lack of consensus is, in part, a result of the fact that the populations studied differ widely in
both the risks posed by climatic shocks and the institutional framework in which rural produc-
ers operate. By studying the consequences of income uncertainty across virtually all cultivated
land, we are able to examine the impact of income uncertainty in agriculture at a much broader
scale, allowing us to explore the extent to which different levels of producer risk and different
income levels impact decision-making in rural areas.
This paper also contributes to the literature that studies agricultural productivity gaps and
their role in explaining cross-country income differences. A number of studies have documented
the role of sector specific distortions for agricultural productivity (Adamopoulos and Restuccia,
2011; Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu, 2008; Tombe, 2014; Adamopoulos, 2011). Researchers have
also examined role of self-selection across sectors in explaining these large gaps (Lagakos and
Waugh, 2013). Our results complement recent work by Donovan (2014) that shows how id-
iosyncratic risk can lead to underinvestment in the agricultural sector. Most closely related to
our work is Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2015), who use the GAEZ data to explore the extent
to which agricultural productivity gaps are driven by production inefficiencies, crop misalloca-
tion, and production inefficiencies across cultivated and cultivatable plots. Consistent with our
results, they find that the majority of cross-country differences in output can be attributed to
economic decision-making rather than differences in land quality.
Our analysis also contributes to a growing literature that uses the historical partition of
African countries to study the impact of national institutions on economic outcomes. Previous
research has found mixed evidence on the importance of institutions (e.g., Michalopoulos and
Papiaoannou, 2013, 2014).3 Our results show that the limited overall impact on rural eco-
nomic activity was partly a reflection of offsetting institutional arrangements. In particular,
the benefits the pro-market institutions that promoted rural investment were counteracted by
the redistributive policies that developed in former French colonies.
3Other research that exploits border discontinuities to identify the role of particular national policies include
Miguel (2004), Cogneau and Moradi (2011), Bubb (2012), and Cogneau, Mesplé-Somps, adn Spielvogel (2012).
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2 Data
2.1 Crop Productivity, Agricultural Output, Land Use, and Prices
We obtain information on crop productivity, agricultural output and land use from the
Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) project, which is organized under the Food and Agri-
culture Organization’s (FAO) and the Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Information on
country-level agricultural prices is obtained from the FAO.
The GAEZ project provides estimates of crop productivity by combining information on
geographic and climatic conditions at the grid cell level with state-of-the art agronomic models
of how each crop will respond to these conditions. The GAEZ productivity estimates are
available for every plot and for every crop, regardless of whether the crop is actually grown. Crop
productivity estimates are calcuated based on a large number of plot growing characteristics.
Invariant characteristics include eight different soil types, elevation, and land gradient. Climatic
variables include rainfall, temperature, humidity, wind speed, and sun exposure. The GAEZ
project is particularly careful in its treatment of weather conditions. Annual crop productivities
are derived based on an aggregation of daily weather conditions, and the model captures how
potential yields of each crop are affected by weather conditions throughout the growing cycle.
Given the large variability climatic conditions, crop productivity is calculated in every year and
for the entire “baseline” period from 1961 to 1990.
These plot characteristics are combined with a vector of hundreds of crop-specific parameters
that capture how the output of each crop responds to environmental conditions. The parameter
estimates are taken from the agronomic literature, and are typically established through field
experiments at agricultural research stations. Because output on a plot of land depends on
farmers decisions over inputs, such as irrigation, fertilizers, machinery, and labor, the GAEZ
project calculates different potential productivity estimates depending on the choice of inputs.
In our analysis we focus on potential productivity from “rain-fed” water supply systems, which
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account for more than 85 percent of agricultural land. Because we are interested in the maxi-
mum attainable yields on a plot of land, the analysis is based on potential yields under “high
input” production technologies. The GAEZ project defines “high input” technologies as mar-
ket oriented farm management that is fully mechanized with low labor intensity, adopts fallow
and conservation measures, uses high yielding seed varieties, and uses optimum applications
of nutrients and chemical pest, disease, and weed control.4 Potential crop productivity are
assembled at the 5-arc-minute level, which corresponds to roughly 10 km by 10 km grid cells at
the equator. The size of the grid cells is determined by the climatic data, which are available
at the 5-arc-minute level. We measure potential crop production, Aki,t, as potential output per
hectare for each of the ten staple crops, k, on a plot of land i, in year t.
The GAEZ project also provides information on cultivated land and actual yields for every
crop in 2000. These data are assembled at the 5 arc-minute level using information drawn from
several different sources. First, GAEZ combines several global studies of land cover to categorize
land use at the grid cell level.5 Second, local measures of agricultural crop production are
compiled from Monfreda et al. (2008). The Monfreda et al. (2008) dataset provides information
on crop yields and cultivated area by crop for a 150 countries at sub-national political units,
and 19,751 political units two levels below the country. Figures 1 presents the map of political
units from Monfreda et al. (2008). High resolution statistics were widely available in areas
of active agricultural production, whereas the larger political units typically covered regions
that were unsuitable for cultivation. The GAEZ project combines the two data sources with
downscaling methods to derive spatial distributions of agricultural activity that are consistent
with both the local data from remote sensing and the agricultural production statistics.6 For
every grid cell, the GAEZ project provides information on agricultural production and land use
4We also explore the sensitivity of the findings to production under “low input” technologies – traditional
farm management that is largely subsistence with labor intensive techniques, and no use of chemicals for pest
control and minimal soil conservations measures.
5Land use is categorized as follows: i) rain-fed cultivation, ii) irrigated cultivation, iii) forest, iv) pasture and
other vegetated land, v) barren and sparsely vegetated land, vi) water, and vii) urban and land required for
housing and infrastructure.
6We explore the sensitivity of the results to excluding countries for which agricultural data is available at
higher levels of aggregation.
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for each crop. Specifically, Qki,2000 measures total output (measured in dry-weight tons) of crop
k on plot i for each of the 10 crops used in the analysis. We denote Li,2000 as the total hectares
of cultivated land on plot i, and ski,2000 the fraction of land devoted to crop k.
Data on agricultural producer prices are obtained from the FAOSTAT program at the FAO
(available at http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E). We assemble data on real output prices, pkc,t,
for each crop, k, in a country, c, in year t.7 Each grid cell observation is matched to relevant
country prices based on the country in which it falls using the country boundaries file available
from the World Borders Dataset (Thematic Mapping).8
The analysis is based on roughly 500,000 grid cells that had positive land used in agriculture
in 2000.9 Table 1 reports the crops and countries used in the analysis. We consider 17 staple
crops that comprise almost two-thirds of arable land worldwide.10 Our primary sample accounts
for almost two thirds of global land devoted to these crops, and spans 87 countries.11
2.2 Variable Construction
We combine the GAEZ data to assemble various measures of agricultural activity at the
plot level. These variables are used to compare observed farm earnings to potential earnings,
given land and climatic conditions.
We calculate total agricultural revenue per plot in 2000 (M4). For each grid cell, we use
information on output per hectare for each crop, Qki,2000, total cultivated land, L
k
i,2000, the share
of land devoted to each crop, ski,2000, and crop output prices, p
k
c,2000 to calculate actual plot
7All prices are inflation-adjusted (DISCUSS).
8For the small number of observations that span multiple country boundaries, we assign the country based
on the grid cell centroid.
9The full GAEZ dataset consists of 2.2 million grid cells. We omit roughly 1.5 million plots that had zero
agricultural production. A further 200,000 plots are excluded because of missing information on crop output
prices.
10Virtually all remaining arable land is devoted to fodder and vegetable production.
11China and Russia account for roughly half of the remaining arable land. These two countries are excluded
from the main analysis because of missing information on historical crop output prices, although we explore the
robustness of the results to their inclusion.
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revenue in 2000 as follows:
M4i,2000 = Li,2000 ·
∑
k
pkc,2000 ·Qki,2000 · ski,2000.
The second variable of interest is potential revenue, M3i,t. This variable is constructed by
holding total agricultural land and crop land shares fixed at their 2000 values, and assuming
that farmers achieved maximum attainable yields per hectare for every crop, k grown, Akit, in
year t. The gap between actual revenue and potential revenue reflects the losses in agricultural
revenue attributable to farmers not maximizing output on a particular plot of land.12 We
calculate potential revenue in every year from 1990 to 2000. Potential revenue may vary from
one year to the next because of both fluctuations in output prices, and changes in potential
crop productivity due to local variation weather and climatic conditions. We calculate potential
revenue (M3) in every year from 1990 to 2000 as
M3i,t = Li,2000 ·
∑
k
pkc,t · Aki,t · ski,2000.
The third variable of interest is maximum potential revenue, M1i,2000, which is calculate in
2000.13 This variable is constructed by holding total agricultural land fixed at its 2000 value,
and assuming that farmers both produce maximum attainable yields for every crop and grow





The solution to this problem is full specialization, in which all agricultural land is devoted to
the revenue maximizing crop, k∗, and all other crop shares are set equal to zero. The maximum
12We discuss the possible reasons for these two variables to differ, and note that differences between actual
and potential revenue may still be fully consistent with farm optimization in the following section.
13We discuss the construction of the final variable of interest, M2, in the following section.
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attainable revenue, M1i, is calculated as
M1i,2000 = Li,2000 · pk∗c,2000 · Ak∗i,2000.
This variable reflects the maximum revenue that farmers could earn on a particular plot of
cultivated land. The gap between M1i,2000 and M3i,2000 reflects losses attributable to ‘crop
misallocation’: the fact that farmers did not allocate all land to the highest return crop.
3 Results
3.1 Losses in Agricultural Revenue
To begin the analysis, we explore the size of losses in agriculture. Table 2 reports the
estimates of actual plot revenue in 2000, potential plot revenue holding cultivated land and
crop shares at their 2000 values, and maximum potential revenue holding total cultivated land
fixed but allowing producers to reallocate land across crops. All three variables are calculated
per hectare of cultivated land and are reported in 2000 USD. We report the results separately
for the full sample and for a restricted sample of plots in which the best crop was grown on at
least 5 percent of cultivated land.14
Panel A reports the estimates of actual and potential revenue per hectare in 2000. The first
row reports the maximum potential revenue, given local geographic and climatic conditions.
These estimates reflect the revenue that could be earned if farmers maximized agricultural
yields and allocated all farmland to the most productive crop. On average, maximum potential
revenue was higher in below-median GDP countries (cols. 3-6). These findings are consistent
with Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2016), who show that differences in natural endowments
cannot account for the agricultural productivity gap in poor countries. These results do not
suggest that climatic and geographic conditions played no role in cross-country agricultural out-
14This sample restriction limits concerns that mis-measurement of local crop prices could cause us to overstate
to the losses attributable to misallocation.
9
put differences. In particular, farmers in low income countries may have been more vulnerable
to volatile output yields caused by climatic and weather shocks, despite having higher average
potential yields. The second row reports potential revenue per plot, based on observed culti-
vated land shares in 2000, assuming that farmers achieved maximum crop yields given land and
climatic constraints. These estimates reflect the revenue that could be if farmers adopted state-
of-the-art production technologies, but did not alter the composition of land fixed. Finally, the
third row reports actual revenue per hectare.
Panel B reports the loss estimates, and decomposes them according to source. Overall,
rural producers earned roughly 30 percent of potential agricultural revenue. Revenue losses were
larger in lower income countries: In above-median GDP countries, actual revenue accounted for
41 to 45 percent of maximum revenue, in below-median GDP countries actual revenue acounted
for 21 to 24 percent of maximum revenue. These losses are calculated holding constant natural
endowments, and reflect differences in the decision-making of rural producers.
To explore the sources of the production gaps, we decompose revenue losses into two broad
categories: i) within-crop production distortions, and ii) cross-crop misallocation. The second
row in Panel B reports the ratio of actual revenue (M4) relative potential revenue (M3). The gap
between these measures reflects within-crop production distortions due to the fact that given
a particular allocation of land, producers did not achieve agronomically feasible returns. In
above-median GDP countries, producers achieved returns that ranged from 77 to 83 percent of
potential. In below-median GDP countries, returns were 49 to 54 percent of potential returns. In
practice, if farmers achieved maximally feasible crop yields, revenue in higher income countries
would increase from 41 (45) to 49 (58), and revenue in lower income countries would increase
from 22 (24) to 40 (49) percent of maximum potential earnings, leading to a reduction in the
revenue gap across countries.
These differences may reflect differences in input technologies. Previous research has iden-
tified a number of determinants of these within-crop productivity losses. Various explanations
include low intermediate inputs and the misallocation of inputs across farms (e.g. Restuccia,
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Yang, and Zhu, 2008; Adamopoulos and Restuccia, 2011), the selection of less productive work-
ers into the agricultural sector (e.g. Lagakos and Waugh, 2013), and underinvestment in farm
technology due to rural producers’ inability to insure against idiosyncratic risks (e.g. Donovan,
2014). It may also be the case that these revenue losses reflect optimal response to cross-country
differences in input prices. For example, if farmers in low income countries chose to adopt lower
production technologies.15
The third row in Panel B reports potential revenue as a percentage of maximum potential
revenue under full specialization. These estimates reflect losses due to the fact that land was
devoted to crops that did not maximize farm revenue. We estimate that cross-crop distortions
were associated large losses in revenue, particularly in lower income countries. These results
suggest that understanding the sources of crop-misallocation are critical for the understanding
agricultural productivity gap.
Before exploring potential determinants of crop-misallocation, we first provide evidence on
the pervasiveness of the different sources of agricultural loss. Figures 3-5 present the distri-
butions of revenue losses separately for above- and below median income countries. Figure 3
reports the distribution of actual revenue relative to maximum potential revenue. Consistent
with the statistics reported in Table 2, there were gaps between maximum potential earnings,
particularly in lower income countries. In these lower income countries, the distribution was
concentrated below 40 percent. Actual returns were substantially higher in above-median coun-
tries. In fact, production exceeded maximum potential on 10 percent agricultural land. Figure
4 reports the distribution of within-crop output losses. Again, there are clear differences in the
patterns of production by country income, consistent with previous research on differences in
input choice by country income (e.g. Donovan, 2016). Figure 5 reports the losses from crop
misallocation. These losses were particularly severe in lower income countries, where the mass
of the distribution is concentrated around 50 percent. In higher income countries, losses from
misallocation were less widespread. On the majority of plots land, misallocation losses were
15Our estimates of losses from uncertainty rely on the particular structure of the crop-return covariance
matrix, and are independent of local input price differences.
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less than 25 percent.
3.2 Determinants of Crop Misallocation
The large losses attributable to cross-crop distortions suggests that, in many areas, land was
not allocated to its most productive use. There are two potential explanations for this result.
First, crop misallocation may have been caused by farmers having specialized in crops that did
not maximize revenue. This situation could reflect differences between local producer prices
and national-level crop prices. High transportation costs and poor market access could cause
within-country variation in agricultural prices, implying that the optimal crop allocation under
national prices may have differed from the optimal allocation under local prices. Differences in
input costs across crops could also lead the revenue maximizing allocation to differ from the
profit maximizing optimal crop allocation. Government agricultural policies, such as quotas or
crop-specific subsidies, could also distort the observed crop allocation away from optimum. Any
of these price distortions could lead to crop misallocation and cause farmers should allocate land
to crops that do not maximize observed revenue. Because these distortions do not influence the
incentive to produce multiple crops, however, this scenario should still be associated with high
level of specialization within-plots.
A second possibility is that land was allocated across multiple different crops in ways that did
not maximize plot revenue. Differences in production decisions across farms could be the result
of information problems which could cause decision-making of some rural producers to differ
from optimum. Heterogeneous access to credit could also limit the ability of some farmers to
allocate land optimally. It is also possible that highly localized differences in land productivity
could lead the optimal local crop allocation to diverge from the average plot-level optimum.
Similarly, rural producers may have adopted outdated crop-cycling practices, rotating land
between higher and lower productivity crops in an effort to preserve soil nutrients.16 Finally, the
16The agronomic model used by the FAO to construct potential yields accounts for optimal fallow periods
and fertilizer usage to best preserve long-run soil quality.
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results could reflect an incentive among rural producers to smooth annual income fluctuations.
Given the highly volatility of incomes, caused by both output price fluctuations and variable
climatic conditions (e.g. Carter, 1997; Shanahan et al., 2009), and the lack of formal insurance
mechanisms (Udry et al, 2016), rural producers may optimally diversify cropland in an effort
to reduce exposure to negative income shocks.
Table 3 presents information on the allocation of land across crops to shed light on the
sources of crop misallocation. Crop diversification was widespread. Nearly five difference crops
were grown on the typical plot of land. On average, the main crop accounted for 56 to 58 percent
of agricultural land, and full specializiation occurred on just 5 percent of plots. These results
are most consistent with the second scenario in which the allocation of land across multiple
different crops led to a divergence between observed and revenue maximizing returns, rather
than rural producers having specialized in suboptimal crops.
Table 3, cols 3-6 show that crop diversification was particularly widespread in lower income
countries. Rural producers grew roughly two additional crops per land, and the main crop
accounted for less than 50 percent of agricultural land on the majority of plots. Specialization
was more common in higher income countries. Roughly 8 percent of plots were fully specialized,
and the main crop accounted for more than 50 percent of agricultural land on three quarter of
plots. These results suggest that large agricultural revenue losses in lower income countries can,
in part, be explained by the higher levels of diversification. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why
farmers in lower income countries devoted land to more different crops. In the next section, we
assess role of income uncertainty in explaining these patterns.
3.3 Income Uncertainty and Losses in Agriculture
3.3.1 A Model of Crop Diversification
To assess the impact of uncertainty for economic losses in agriculture, we develop a standard
mean-variance portfolio problem. This framework has been widely used since Markowitz (1952)
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to study investor decision-making in the presence of risk. The model, which was originally
developed to study the portfolio decisions of investors, applies natural to the decision-making
problem of rural producers, who must decide how to allocate land across a variety of crops
that have different expected returns and carry different levels of risk. The results provide a
benchmark against which we can compare the actual crop choices of farmers.
We consider a rural economy with one unit of agricultural land.17 Let s be a k-vector
where each element sk denotes the fraction of land devoted to crop k and
∑
k sk = 1. Farmers
are assumed to face uncertainty in the realization of individual crop returns, which may be
correlated across crops. Let r denote the k-vector of mean crop returns with typical element
rk, and V as a k×k covariance matrix with typical element σij denoting the covariance between
the returns for crops i and j.18 According to this setup, any portfolio of crops chosen by the
















The farmer is assumed to trade-off higher returns against increased risk in the portfolio
according to the following formulation:
maximize Rp = s
Tr (1)
subject to σ2p = s
TV s, sT1 = 1, s ≥ 0.
The farmer’s problem is to maximize the portfolio return subject to three constraints. First,
the variance of the portfolio cannot exceed a desired level, σ2p. Second, the amount of land used
for agricultural production cannot exceed the total amount available. Third, the amount of
land devoted to each crop must be non-negative.19
17This normalization abstracts from decisions over how much land to devote to agriculture.
18To ensure that V is nonsingular and positive definite, we assume that no two crops have perfectly correlated
returns and that all crops have strictly positive variances.
19This constraint is equivalent to a short-selling restriction in the standard portfolio asset allocation problem.
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The solution to the problem is an optimal set of weights, s∗, that achieves the highest
expected return given an particular level of portfolio volatility.20 Solving for the optimal weights
for different values of σ2p, we can trace out the mean-variance efficient (MVE) locus, the portfolio
mean-variance pairs (Rp, σ
2
p) that provide the highest return for a given variances.
21 Figure 1
displays the upward-sloping MVE locus. Intuitively, as the tolerance for risk increases, the
farmer is able to achieve greater expected returns. All combinations of (Rp, σ
2
p) that fall below
this locus are suboptimal, since the farmer could achieve higher expected returns without
increasing risk. We denote RMaxi as the highest possible return the farmer could obtain on a
plot of land, i. Meanwhile, let denote RGi as the return associated with the global minimum
variance portfolio – the crop choice with the lowest variability.
This simple framework can be applied to assess the impact of uncertainty on agricultural
losses. Figure 2 provides intuition for the analysis. Consider a farmer operating on a plot of
land, i, who chooses a vector of crops, si that yields a return-variance combination (Ri, σ
2
i ).
Given the particular characteristics of the plot, RMaxi represents the maximum revenue that
could be generated on the plot under full specialization. Meanwhile, R∗i represents the return
from the efficient crop portfolio based on the observed plot variance, σ2i . This value reflects the
highest agricultural earnings that could be earned without increasing the farmer’s level of risk
exposure.
Total revenue losses on plot i, RMaxi − Ri, can be decomposed into two sources: 1) losses
attributable to uncertainty, RMaxi − R∗i , and 2) residual losses from ‘crop misallocation’, R∗i −
Ri. The first term reflects losses caused by the fact that farmers may diversify their crop
portfolio to reduce income volatility. This gap reflects that fact that crop diversification lowers
expected returns, and given a particular risk tolerance, σ2i , it is impossible for farmers to achieve
maximum returns. The second term reflects the residual losses from ‘crop misallocation’ that
20The farmer’s specific utility function does not enter the problem, although portfolio optimization has been
shown to be consistent with expected utility maximization with quadratic utility (see Ingersoll, 1987, for a
discussion).
21An analytic solution to (1) does not exist, although the optimal weights can be calculated using numerical
methods
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cannot be attributable to uncertainty. These distortions could be the result of many factors,
including differences between local and national output prices, differences in crop-specific input
costs, and government policies that distort production across crops.
To apply this framework empirically, we use information on the crop portfolio, si, and the
vector of potential crop returns, ri, for every plot i in the year 2000. We also require information
on the level on uncertainty facing farmers. We combine annual changes in crop productivity,
M3i,t and output prices, p
k
c,t, from 1990 to 2000 to construct the plot-specific covariance matrix,
V i, with typical element, σjk, denoting the covariance in returns between crops j and k over
the time period. These elements depend both on annual variation in local climatic conditions
that differentially impact the potential yields of each crop, and annual co-movements in output
prices.22 Crucially, our analysis is based on variation in exogenous potential crop returns, rather
than variation in actual crop returns that may be influenced by the decision-making of rural
producers.23 We combine the covariance matrix, V i, with the observed land allocation in 2000,




i V isi. This variable captures the level
of risk facing farmers, given their chosen crop portfolio. Given the plot variance, σ2i , we solve
the farmer’s problem in (1) to determine the MVE crop portfolio, s∗i , that provides the highest
potential return for the given plot variance, σ2i . We combine the MVE crop portfolio with the
vector of potential crop returns in 2000 to calculate the maximum potential return given the
observed risk tolerance (or MVE potential return): M2∗i,2000 = s
∗T
i ri.
To assess the impact of uncertainty on agricultural losses, we combine information on
potential crop revenue, M3i,2000, maximum potential revenue, M1i,2000, and the MVE po-
tential crop revenue, M2∗i . We decompose the total losses from ‘crop misallocation, ∆i =
M1i,2000
/







, and the residual gap between observed potential returns and maximum






. Our identification strategy exploits the spe-
22In robustness exercises, we re-estimate the covariance matrix based solely on annual changes in potential
yields, holding output prices fixed at their 2000 levels.
23For example, farmers might undertake costly investments to mitigate the effects of a rainfall shortage.
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cific structure of the covariance in crop returns, that are driven by exogenous climatic and
output price fluctuations. As a result, we can decompose the sources of agricultural losses into
two broad sources: 1) those that are explained by uncertainty and 2) those driven by farmer
decisions that are orthogonal to portfolio risk.
3.3.2 Economic Uncertainty and Losses in Agriculture
To what extent did rural producers face uncertain returns? Table 4 reports estimates of
potential revenue volatility for the period 1990 to 2000. The standard deviation in potential
returns was 28 to 29 percent of average annual earnings under full specialization. The base-
line levels of rural income uncertainty were similar across higher and lower income countries.
Nevertheless, farmers responded variable differently to the same underlying risk. Producers
poorer countries adopted crop portfolios that were less variable than producers in richer coun-
tries. These heterogeneous responses may partly explain the differences in revenue losses across
countries (Table 2, panel B), and are consistent with different levels of diversification reported
in Table 3.
Motivated by the high level of income uncertainty and the extent to which agricultural land
is diversified across multiple crops, we decompose the sources of ‘crop misallocation’. Table 5,
Panel A reports the estimates of potential revenue per hectare under the current crop allocation,
M3i,2000, the mean-variance efficient portfolio given the observed plot variance, M2
∗
i,2000, and
the revenue maximizing allocation, M1i,2000. In panel B, we decompose the losses from crop
misallocation, ∆i, that were driven by uncertainty, ∆Uncertainty, and other factors, ∆
Residual
i .
Economic uncertainty led to large losses in agricultural revenue. We estimate that 80 per-
cent of ‘crop misallocation’ losses can be attributed to the gap between the returns under the
MVE portfolio and the returns under full specialization. These results suggest that there was
little scope for rural producers to have increased plot returns without taking on additional
risk. The remaining 20 percent of agricultural losses were due to residual distortions that were
uncorrelated with uncertainty motives. These factors reflects other forces driving farmers to
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divert land from revenue maximizing crops, and might have included differences between local
and national level output prices or crop specific input costs, information problems among rural
producers, or outdated crop-cycling practices. The effects of income uncertainty were particu-
larly acute in lower income countries. We estimate that the losses from uncertainty were larger
in lower income countries (31= 100 − 69 to 37= 100 − 63) relative to higher income countries
(30=100 − 70 to 24= 100 − 76). Poorer farmers were also more likely to deviate from full
specialization for reasons unrelated to uncertainty.
In Table 6, we explore the robustness of the loss estimates. For reference, column (1)
reports the baseline estimates. In column (2), we explore the sources of revenue uncertainty,
re-estimating the potential revenue assuming that farmers faced fixed prices for the period
1990 to 2000, so that the incentive to diversify can be solely attributable to fluctuations in
climatic conditions. Estimated losses from crop misallocation are similar, suggesting that the
main results are not sensitive to current versus average output prices. When crop prices are
held constant, economic uncertainty is estimated to account for a smaller fraction of total crop
misallocation. Comparing the estimates in columns (1) and (2), we calculate that annual output
price variability can account for roughly one quarter of the losses from crop misallocation, while
the remaining three quarters can be attributed to climatic variability.
In column (3), we report results based on calorie-weighted output.24 This analysis addresses
the concern that in many rural areas that had limited access to national markets, calorie content
may provide a more accurate measure of output value. Calorie-weighted misallocation losses
are slightly smaller than the estimate losses based on country-level prices, perhaps because
many small scale subsistence farmers allocated farmland according to crop consumption value.
Nevertheless, the relative importance of income uncertainty is comparable to the estimates
found in column (2), in which output prices also did not vary from one year to the next.
In columns (4) to (6) we explore the sensitivity of the main findings to several alternative
sample restrictions. In column (4) we restrict the analysis to plots on which known crop
24Information on crop calorie content was obtained from the FAO (available at http://faostat3.fao.org)
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account for at least 75 percent of cultivated land.25 This sample restriction does not affect
the qualititative findings. In column (5), we restrict the sample to plots on which the highest
revenue crop accounted for at least 25 percent of cultivated land. By focusing on plots on which
farmers grow a large amount of the highest revenue crop, we limit concerns that mismeasurement
in prices might to an overestimate of misallocation losses. In practice this sample restriction
leads only to a modest reduction in estimated losses (59.5% in column (4) versus 53.7% in
column (1)), suggesting that most of the losses from crop misallocation cannot be attributed
to mismeasurement of local prices. The total losses from economic uncertainty are unchanged,
although, this sample restriction (by construction) leads to a significant decrease in residual
losses. In the final column, we exclude plots for which potatoes or cassava were the revenue
maximizing crop, for which energy inputs were substantially lower (Pimentel, 2009). In practice,
this restriction has little impact on the main findings.
3.3.3 Determinants of Losses Within and Across Countries
Figures 6 reports the distributions of misallocation losses across agricultural plots in above-
and below-median GDP countries. Crop misallocation was pervasive. Fewer than 10 percent of
plots were fully specialized in high income countries and the median plot earned just 60 percent
of maximum potential revenue. The losses from misallocation were even larger in lower income
countries. Just 2.7 percent of land was specialized and three quarters of plots earned less than
60 percent of maximum potential revenue.
Figures 7 and 8 decompose the sources of crop misallocation across plots. Rural producers
in lower income countries were disproportionately impacted both by economic uncertainty and
residual distortions. In above-median GDP countries, almost half of plots achieved variance
efficient returns that were greater than 80 percent of maximum output, and fewer than 20
percent of plots had residual losses that were larger than 20 percent. In contrast, in below-
median GDP countries, just 20 percent of plots had M2 returns that exceeded 80 percent, and
25In practice, fodder accounts for the majority of unknown cultivated land.
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more than 40 percent of plots experienced residual losses that were greater than 20 percent.
The previous results show that crop misallocation was pervasive across much of the world’s
cultivated land, and that both economic uncertainty and residual distortions contributed to
losses on a majority of plots. What remains unclear is the extent to which these losses varied
across countries, and the relative importance of economic uncertainty and residual distortions in
explaining regional variation in crop misallocation. To examine these questions, we estimate the
impact of economic uncertainty and residual distortions on within- and across-country variation
in crop misallocation. To separately identify the causal impact of economic uncertainty and
residual distortions, we report the results after controlling for any remaining correlation for
each explanatory variable.26
The top panel of Table 7 decomposes the sources of crop misallocation into variation that
occurred within- and across-countries. We find that roughly one-third of the total variation was
driven by within-country variation while the remaining two-thirds was driven by cross-country
variation. Decomposing the source of this variation, we find that roughly three quarters of
within-country variation in crop misallocation can be attributed to differences in economic
uncertainty, while the remaining one quarter was the result of unexplained residual local losses.
Economic uncertainty was an even greater driver of crop misallocation across countries, and the
relative explanatory power is roughly twice as large in the cross-country analysis (see figures 9
and 10 for the residual plots).
3.3.4 Agricultural Losses in Africa: A Border Discontinuity Approach
The previous results show that economic uncertainty was the principal source of the geo-
graphic variation in crop misallocation, and that its impact was disproportinately large on losses
across countries. There are a number of potential explanations for this result. First, rural pro-
ducers in different countries may have been exposed to varying levels of underlying uncertainty
due to regional climatic shocks causing different levels of diversification across countries. Sec-
26By construction, this adjustment guarantees that all coefficient estimates are equal to one, although in
practice, controlling for correlation has little impact on the estimated effects.
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ond, the results could simply reflect the wide differences in economic conditions across countries
that could influence agricultural activity through a variety of channels including credit market
access, input costs and technological adoption, and non-agricultural employment opportuni-
ties (e.g., Adamopoulos and Restuccia, 2011; Lagakos and Waugh, 2013; Donovan, 2014). A
third possibility is that the results capture differences in government policies aimed at reducing
uncertainty in the agricultural sector.
We study the sources of agricultural losses in Africa. The African context provides a par-
ticularly useful case study on the effects of economic uncertainty for three main reasons. First,
local variability in weather conditions are an important source of economic uncertainty (e.g.,
Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs, 2001), and the vast majority of rural producers lack access to
formal insurance and credit markets. Second, modern day country borders were shaped by the
historical European colonization, through a process that generally did not consider local ethnic
or geographic features (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2017). As a result of the historical
partition, farmers facing similar geographic and climatic conditions were exposed to widely dif-
ferent instutional environments. We focus on differences in the evolution of institutions across
former English and French colonies. Researchers have argued that the English common law
system supports market outcomes, including property rights enforcement, functioning credit
markets, and openness to trade (La Porta et al., 2008), all of which may have fostered agri-
cultural development and led to private solutions to rural economic uncertainty. On the other
hand, former French colonies typically had larger public sectors and devoted a disproportionate
share of public expenditure to the agricultural sector, which may have mitigated the impacts
of economic uncertainty.
We adopt a border regression discontinuity approach to study the determinants of crop
misallocation in Africa. We estimate the following specification:
yibc = α + βBritishc + f(distic) + γb + εibc, (2)
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where yibc denotes agricultural outcome on plot i, located within 100 kilometers of border b,
in country c. The model includes a cubic control for plot distance to the border that we allow
to vary according to French versus British colonial origin, f(distic), and a border-specific fixed
effect, γb. The explanatory variable of interest, Britishc, is a dummy variable equal to one
for former British colonies.27 The coefficient β captures the combined impact of institutional
and economic changes that occurred in countries established under British colonization relative
to those that were established under French colonization. The analysis is based on a sample
of 8,623 plots of land spanning 14 countries and 10 border pairs. We report double-clustered
standard errors at the country and at the border level using the method of Cameron, Gelbach,
and Miller (2011) to account for spatial correlation and arbitrary residual correlation within
each dimension.
Before reporting the results, we first evaluate the validity of the research design. Table 8
reports the estimated effects of British colonization on potential crop productivity. Intuitively,
if country border were created for reasons unrelated to local land characteristics, we should
not observe systematic differences in land productivity across former British or French colonies.
We report the estimates for five staple crops: maize, pulses, cassava, palm oil, and sugarcane.
Panel A reports the coefficient estimates based on all border plots. There is no evidence that
agricultural productivity changed discontinously at the country border. The coefficient esti-
mates are all statistically insignificant and generally small in magnitude. These results broadly
support the identifying assumptions that the drawing of country borders under colonization
was largely made independently of considerations of localized geographic conditions. Panel B
reports the results for plots that had positive cultivated land. Again there are no significant
differences in crop productivity across countries, suggesting that different policies that devel-
oped following British colonization had little effect on extensive margin decisions over which
land was cultivated.
Table 9 reports the results for agricultural output. Columns (1) to (3) report the overall
27To avoid misassignment of the relevant country to agricultural land, we exclude plots located within 10
kilometers from a border.
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impact of the British system on revenue losses in agriculture (M4/M1). Observed agricultural
returns were somewhat higher in former British colonies, although none of the differences are
statistically significant. We decompose the sources of these revenue differences into crop mis-
allocation (cols. 4-6) and within-crop distortions (cols. 7-9). The results show that the small
overall impacts were the result of two offsetting forces. Farmers in former British colonies
appear to have adopted more advanced inputs, achieving higher crop-specific returns. At the
same time, producers in former British colonies displayed higher levels of crop misallocation.
Together these results show that despite having limited overall impact on overall agricultural
output, the economic and institutional systems that developed following British and French
colonization differentially affected the decision-making of rural producers.
Table 10 decomposes the sources of crop misallocation across former British and French
colonies. Roughly two thirds of the gap in crop misallocation can be explained by economic
uncertainty (cols. 7-9). In particular, despite having access to equally productive land and
facing similar climatic conditions, farmers in former French and British colonies responded
differently to output risk. Producers in former French colonies took on greater levels of risk,
and adopted a less diversified and higher yield crop portfolio. Consistent with this result, we
estimate significant cross-country differences in the number of crops grown, with farmers in
former British colonies growing an additional 1.3 crops per plot on average. The remaining one
third of the gap can be accounted for by residual factors that disproportionately affected the
allocation of land in former British colonies (cols. 4-6).
The results in Tables 9 and 10 show that farmers in former British colonies achieved higher
crop-specific yields, but adopted a more heavily diversified crop portfolio. These findings re-
flect the combined effects of the many differences in legal and institutional arrangements that
emerged post-colonization. The British common law system is thought to have fostered growth
and political stability by promoting a host of private sector reforms. Consistent with this view,
former British colonies had higher levels of GDP per capita, had a higher levels of trade. Former
British colonies also score higher on the polity IV index of democratization. Meanwhile, former
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French colonies had higher levels of government expenditure as fraction of GDP and devoted a
disproportionate share of government spending to the agricultural sector. These different insti-
tutional arrangements and economic conditions appear to have impacted the decision-making
of rural producers. On the one hand, farmers in former British colonies adopted more intensive
agricultural techniques, and achieved higher crop-specific returns. This gap might have been
driven by the private sector expansion and improved credit markets that fostered investments
in agricultural inputs. On the other hand, these same farmers were more heavily influenced by
economic uncertainty, perhaps because they lacked access to the security provided the govern-
ment.28
4 Conclusion
Using FAO data on agriculture for cultivated areas that spans all arable land, this paper
estimates the revenue losses in agriculture. We identify a new source of misallocation associated
with the fact that agricultural land is often not allocated to the highest revenue crops. ‘Crop
misallocation’ was an important driver of losses in agriculture, and revenue could be increased
by almost 100 percent if currently cultivated land were allocated to its most productive use.
Applying a standard portfolio theory framework to historical data on annual potential crop
yields and agricultural prices, we find that uncertainty over annual income was the primary
reason why farmers did not specialize. The losses attributable to income uncertainty were
particularly large in lower income countries. Nevertheless, comparing agricultural outcomes
across the borders of African countries, we find that pro-private sector policies in former British
colonies led to greater investment in agricultural inputs, but did not mitigate the effects of
economic uncertainty. Instead, it appear that a combination of well-functioning private systems
along with non-market public interventions that reduce exposure to risk are needed to foster
28In fact, under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), a target was set
for African countries to allocate at least 10 percent of public expenditures to the agricultural sector. One of the
four pillars of this progam was “reducing the vulnerability of rural households and risk management”.
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broad-based improvements in agricultural outcomes in developing countries.
This paper’s findings have relevance for policies aimed at rural economic development. Much
of the recent empirical literature has emphasized the importance of major infrastructure invest-
ments (e.g Adamopoulos, 2011; Tombe, 2014; Dinkelman, 2011) and rural production technolo-
gies (e.g. Donovan, 2014). Nevertheless, these projects require major upfront investments and
the benefits may only emerge after a period of several decades (Devine Jr, 1983; David, 1990;
Lewis and Severnini, 2017). This paper’s results suggest that policies aimed at risk reduction
may also promote rural economic development.
It is important to emphasize that our estimates likely do not reflect the full effects of agri-
cultural income uncertainty. In particular, rural residents may have engaged in a variety of
alternative strategies to mitigate local risks. These might have included precautionary sav-
ings (Deaton 1990; 1991), underinvestment in agricultural technologies (Donovan, 2014), or
cross-regional insurance. A comprehensive assessment of the economic costs of rural income
uncertainty must also account for the losses stemming from these other mitigation strategies.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that our partial equilibrium estimates are unlikely
to reflect the general equilibrium impacts of broad-based programs aimed at lowering rural
income uncertainty, which will ultimately depend on output price elasticities. Nevertheless,
there may still be wide scope for risk-mitigation policies to improve welfare, by lowering the
labor demands needed to meet subsistence consumption requirements, and promoting the rural-
transition. Further study of the general equilbrium consequences of these policies is a potentially
interesting avenue for future research.
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Figure 1: Political Units for Crop Production
Notes: This map shows the political units used in the crop data set. These include 2299 political units one
level below the country (e.g., state or province) from 150 countries, and 19,751 units two levels below the
country (e.g., county or district) for 73 countries. Source: Monfreda, Ramankutty, and Foley (2008).














Figure 3: Total Losses in Agriculture: M4/M1
(a) Above median GDP (b) Below median GDP
Figure 4: Losses from Productivity: M4/M3
(a) Above median GDP (b) Below median GDP
Figure 5: Losses from Misallocation: M3/M1
(a) Above median GDP (b) Below median GDP
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Figure 6: Misallocation in Agriculture: M3/M1
(a) Above median GDP (b) Below median GDP
Figure 7: Losses from Insurance
(a) Above median GDP (b) Below median GDP
Figure 8: Residual Losses
(a) Above median GDP (b) Below median GDP
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Figure 9: Determinants of Misallocation (Log M3/M1): Within Countries
(a) Economic Uncertainty (b) Residual
Notes: These figures report the residual plots on the determinants of Log M3/M1 within
countries that correspond to Table 7, col. 1.
Figure 10: Determinants of Misallocation (M3/M1): Across Countries
(a) Economic Uncertainty (b) Residual
Notes: These figures report the residual plots on the determinants of Log M3/M1 across
countries that correspond to Table 7, col. 4.
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Notes: These figures report potential productivity for each crop across former British
(left-hand side) and French (right-hand side) colonies, by average plot distance to the
border.
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Table 1: Agricultural Land, by Crop and by Country
Panel A: Agricultural land, by crop
Cultivated % World % % Land Allocated to Crop
Land Arable Cropland Below median Above median
Crop (Millions Ha) Land in sample GDP GDP
All 899 64.2 63.7
Wheat 215 15.4 57.9 13.1 28.7
Rice 154 11.0 39.3 24.7 4.6
Maize 138 9.9 73.1 8.8 21.5
Soybean 74 5.3 77.1 3.3 19.5
Pulses 45 3.2 103.4 12.0 4.6
Sorghum 41 2.9 57.1 8.3 2.4
Millet 37 2.7 43.6 10.6 0.1
Potato 30 2.1 59.7 1.0 1.2
Cassava, Yam 25 1.8 101.6 4.2 1.3
Cocoa, Coffee, Tea 25 1.8 106.9 3.5 2.8
Rapeseed 26 1.8 73.9 2.0 3.5
Groundnut 23 1.7 53.6 4.8 0.4
Sunflower 21 1.5 45.0 0.5 2.5
Sugarcane 19 1.4 78.9 2.0 2.5
Oilpalm 10 0.7 63.3 0.9 1.5
Olive 8 0.6 54.4 0.2 2.0
Sugarbeet 6 0.4 84.6 0.0 0.9
Panel B: Agricultural land, by Country
% Country’s % Country’s % Country’s
Arable Land Arable Land Arable Land
World 60.8 Germany 43.0 Niger 58.2
Algeria 19.1 Ghana 113.1 Nigeria 83.0
Argentina 82.3 Greece 68.6 Pakistan 15.1
Australia 24.5 Guinea 72.2 Panama 42.6
Austria 47.4 Honduras 80.9 Paraguay 73.0
Bangladesh 143.3 Hungary 61.4 Peru 21.4
Belize 83.4 India 87.9 Philippines 145.2
Bhutan 88.0 Indonesia 105.3 Poland 33.8
Bolivia 53.9 Iran 40.8 Portugal 56.8
Botswana 16.0 Ireland 10.1 Rwanda 72.6
Brazil 73.3 Israel 39.0 Senegal 55.8
Brunei 36.6 Italy 64.1 South Africa 23.0
Burkina Faso 86.6 Jamaica 43.1 Spain 29.7
Burundi 64.7 Japan 44.9 Sri Lanka 119.3
Cambodia 56.6 Jordan 37.8 Sudan 13.4
Cameroon 38.5 Kenya 72.4 Suriname 84.1
Canada 42.3 Laos 95.0 Sweden 0.7
Chile 31.5 Lebanon 91.7 Switzerland 38.6
Colombia 113.7 Madagascar 74.6 Tanzania 74.9
Congo 34.8 Malaysia 394.7 Thailand 86.6
Costa Rica 125.9 Mali 55.7 Togo 46.3
Cotedivoire 173.9 Malta 51.4 Tunisia 66.5
Cyprus 15.8 Mexico 53.0 Turkey 54.3
Denmark 34.4 Morocco 31.8 United Kingdom 48.5
Dominican Republic 68.0 Mozambique 64.9 Uruguay 29.1
Ecuador 106.8 Namibia 29.0 United States 46.7
El Salvador 104.4 Nepal 144.1 Venezuela 50.2
Equatorial Guinea 42.2 Netherlands 47.2 Vietnam 158.3
France 54.0 New Zealand 6.6
Gambia 86.5 Nicaragua 40.1
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Table 2: Actual and Potential Plot Revenue
All countries Above median Below median
GDP per capita GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Potential and Actual Revenue per Ha in USD
Max Potential Rev (M1) 2175.4 1831.4 1877.4 1615.7 2451.8 2018.9
Potential Rev (M3) 953.1 967.5 915.6 935.8 987.8 995.0
Actual Rev (M4) 642.3 596.8 761.8 718.3 531.4 491.1
Panel B: Losses in Revenue
Actual Rev/Max Potential Rev (M4/M1 %) 29.5 32.6 40.6 44.5 21.7 24.3
Actual Rev/Potential Rev (M4/M3 %) 67.4 61.7 83.2 76.8 53.8 49.4
Potential Rev/Max Potential Rev (M3/M1 %) 43.8 52.8 48.8 57.9 40.3 49.3
Full sample Y Y Y
Restricted sample: (Best crop Y Y Y
≥ 5% cultivated area)
Table 3: Allocation of Cultivated Land
All countries Above median Below median
GDP per capita GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N(crops) 4.8 4.7 3.9 3.7 5.6 5.6
% Land devoted to main crop
Average 58.0 55.5 62.7 62.0 53.6 49.8
I(>95%) 5.3 5.2 7.6 9.1 2.9 2.1
I(66-95%) 19.9 25.6 27.8 24.3 23.5 16.0
I(50-66%) 31.1 30.9 38.7 38.9 23.6 24.3
I(33-50%) 33.1 29.2 24.5 26.3 33.6 39.0
I(<33%) 10.6 9.2 1.3 1.5 16.5 18.6
Full sample Y Y Y
Restricted sample: (Best crop Y Y Y
≥ 5% cultivated area)
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Table 4: Variability in Agricultural Revenue
All countries Above median Below median
GDP per capita GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Variability in Plot Revenue
Standard deviation
Highest yield crop 761.8 625.0 538.0 457.5 969.3 770.7
Currently cultivated crops 310.7 320.0 214.3 219.4 400.1 407.3
Coeff. of variation (%)
Highest yield crop 29.1 28.4 28.2 28.4 30.0 28.5
Currently cultivated crops 13.9 15.5 15.0 17.2 12.8 14.0
Full sample Y Y Y
Restricted sample: (Best crop Y Y Y
≥ 5% cultivated area)
Table 5: Uncertainty and Losses in Agricultural Revenue
All countries Above median Below median
GDP per capita GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Potential Revenue Estimates
Max Potential Rev (M1) 2175.4 1831.0 1877.4 1615.7 2451.8 2018.9
MVE Potential Rev (M2) 1180.2 1172.8 1092.1 1055.2 1262.0 1275.0
Potential Rev (M3) 953.1 967.5 915.6 935.8 987.8 995.0
Panel B: Decomposing Revenue Losses
M3/M1 53.7 59.3 61.1 69.0 46.9 50.9
M3/M2 81.4 82.5 86.9 90.8 76.2 75.2
M2/M1 66.1 71.8 69.8 75.5 62.8 68.5
Full sample Y Y Y
Restricted sample: (Best crop Y Y Y
≥ 5% cultivated area)
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Table 6: Uncertainty and Losses in Agricultural Revenue
Restricted samples
Baseline Fixed Calorie Known crops Best crop Exclude
estimates prices weighted >75% of >25% of plots with
output cultivated cultivated potato, pulses
land land best crop
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Potential Revenue Estimates
Max Potential Rev (M1) 2175.4 2061.9 2987.5 1849 1541.6 1888.1
MVE Potential Rev (M2) 1180.2 1395.5 2031.6 1100.4 1228.6 1097.4
Potential Rev (M3) 953.1 958.3 1545.4 945.2 1120.6 885.5
Panel B: Decomposing Revenue Losses
M3/M1 53.7 54.7 59.3 59.5 78.7 55.4
M3/M2 81.4 74.7 76.4 85.9 92.1 81.4
M2/M1 66.1 74.9 79 59.5 85.0 68.2
Table 7: Determinants of Misallocation
Within countries Across countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Log Crop Misallocation (Log M3/M1)
Fraction Variation (dep. var.) 0.33 0.49 0.34 0.67 0.51 0.64
Log(M2/M1)
R-squared 0.765 0.734 0.725 0.908 0.814 0.943
T-statistic 17.8 20.5 16.7 23.3 14.1 31.9
Coeff 1 1 1 1 1 1
SE [0.0563] [0.04879] [0.05982] [0.04290] [0.0708] [0.0313]
Log(M3/M2)
R-squared 0.2503 0.3662 0.1781 0.1242 0.1357 0.1348
T-statistic 5.4 6.0 5.4 2.5 3.3 2.2
Coeff 1 1 1 1 1 1
SE [0.1847] [0.1662] [0.1858] [0.3982] [0.2988] [0.4506]
Relative explanatory power: M3/M1 vs. M3/M2
R-squared Ratio 3.1 2.0 4.1 7.3 6.0 7.0
T-statistic Ratio 3.3 3.4 3.1 9.3 4.2 14.4
Observations 486,872 351,407 450,399 87 87 85
Full Sample Y Y
Best crop ≥ 5% Y Y
Trimmed sample Y Y
Notes: This table reports the results for the impact of uncertainty (Log M2/M1) and residual factors (Log
M3/M2) on crop misallocation (Log M3/M1). Each cell reports the results from a difference regression.
All models are weighted by total cultivated area. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
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